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Introduction
If you are an economist, you are reading this 
article without any fi nancial incentive from your 
employer. It is equally diffi cult to verify that such 
activity will contribute to your growth of human 
capital and increased productivity in research 
or teaching. (That does not prevent the authors 
from hoping it will.) The standard economic 
model, which explains employee’s effort only 
through the wage (determined by productivity), 
is therefore incomplete. In particular, it does not 
consider that incentives to work do not have to 
be monetary; in other words, that there are other 
things besides the disutility of labour ((Kamenica, 
2012) and section 1.3 here). This perspective 
article aims to make the simple labour economic 
model more realistic in order to account for 
the mounting empirical evidence, which might 
otherwise be dismissed as anomalies. Why 
do employers pay employees more than their 
reservation wage? Under what circumstances 
do workers exert greater level of effort than the 
contracted one? When does effort decrease 
in spite of a rising wage (and there being no 
income effect)? Under what circumstances does 
yardstick-based remuneration fail?
The answer to these questions does not 
consist in a mere list of incongruous (and often 
even opposing) psychological regularities, 
cognitive biases and heuristics, sometimes 
presented as a caricature of behavioural 
economics (as well as of industrial and 
organizational psychology). This text aims, 
instead, to record economic agents’ behaviour 
in the traditional economic method – using the 
usual effi cient and coherent system of principles 
applicable under defi ned conditions (Barberis, 
2013; Rabin, 1998).
The idea of applying behavioural economics 
to the workplace is supported by the fact that 
fi rms will not, in the short run, undertake any 
optimising corrections: “Rational arbitrageurs 
cannot easily limit suboptimal corporate-
fi nance decisions, since it is hard to short-sell 
a CEO or CFO. Quite the opposite occurs: top 
executives may be entrenched and hard to get 
rid of. Biases and mistakes in decision-making 
are thus much more likely to have a persistent 
and large effect in corporate fi nance than on 
asset pricing.“ (Camerer & Malmendier, 2007, 
p. 236).
To shield ourselves from a charge that 
behavioural economics’ fi ndings are based 
on artifi cial laboratory experiments (Levitt & 
List, 2007), we try to rely on studies using real 
world data and fi eld experiments (DellaVigna, 
2009); not on data from situations involving 
inexperienced players with weak motivations, 
mostly students (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010), which often limit the applicability of 
such fi ndings to environments as stimulation 
as companies. Still, laboratory experiments of 
the labour market do enable the researcher to 
control variables and causal relations in a way 
not affordable by another empirical method, 
so the text does refer to those. Falk and Fehr 
(2003) or more recently List and Rasul (2011) 
discuss the limitations of such experiments, 
especially with regard to unrepresentative 
composition of participants, insignifi cant 
rewards, limited number of observations and 
non-reproducibility of some real world problems 
in a designed experiment. Yet they conclude 
that experiments (laboratory and fi eld) are 
a very useful complement to standard real 
world data analysis. They afford us a relatively 
quick and low-cost insight into the functioning of 
studied phenomena. Another pragmatic reason 
for using laboratory studies is the dearth of real 
world data, for example on shirking employees 
who have no motivation to reveal their true 
behaviour.
The article is organised as follows: the fi rst 
section introduces a simple model of a worker’s 
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decision and then augments it by some realistic 
aspects of real workers’ decision-making 
inspired by insights of behavioural economics. 
The second section concentrates briefl y on 
the specifi cs of decision-making by company 
managers.
1. Worker’s Decision
The standard model of worker’s decision 
exposes worker i to wage w in return for 
a homogenous product, and she decides how 
much labour to supply given her marginal 
disutility of labour, or cost of labour c(ei) as 
a function of her effort ei; under the usual 
assumptions, c(ei ) is an increasing and convex 
function. Worker’s output is a function of 
her effort and abilities (human capital) si, i.e. 
xi = f(ei ,si )+ θi where θi are random shock in 
productivity with distribution m(θi ). The company 
receives the output xi and pays the wage w(xi ) 
which is either linear in output w(xi ) = wk + βxi 
in case of piece-rate remuneration, or fi xed at 
w(xi) = wi, possibly augmented by an optional 
bonus bi upon achieving a certain goal t, i.e. 
w(xi) = {wi | xi < t; wi + bi | xi ≥ t}. Worker’s 
expected utility of labour is then
U(ei,si,w) = ∫θi u(w(f(ei,si ) +
+ θi)) m(θi ) dθi – c(ei ). 
(1)
Leaving out for simplicity the shocks and the 
exogenously determined human capital effect, 
the reduced form of expected utility becomes
U(ei,w) = u(w(ei )) – c(ei ). (2)
Based on this intentionally simple model 
(Camerer & Malmendier, 2007), we argue that 
its components and underlying assumptions 
do not describe (even in an “as if” mode) 
workers’ behaviour since their decisions employ 
different mechanisms and are infl uenced by 
other important factors. We highlight 4 areas 
worth incorporating into the standard model 
(cf. similarly (Bewley, 2007; DellaVigna, 
2009, ch. 2.2; Fehr, Goette, & Zehnder, 2009; 
 Al-Ubaydli & List, 2016)).
When choosing their effort, workers are not 
infl uenced only by the wage level or its change, 
but also by i) comparison of the wage offer to 
a reference level (Additionally, the relationship 
between wage and output is not necessarily 
linear: low productivity is still possible even at 
exceptionally high remuneration rates since 
the stress from worrying about losing such high 
reward will be refl ected in a greater frequency 
of errors (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & 
Mazar, 2009)). Such reference level does not 
have to be a wage in the form of a fi nancial 
reward; it can also be interpreted as ii) a quality 
signal of the social relationship between the 
employer (principal) and the employee (agent). 
The reward contains elements of mutual 
reciprocity. As a result, then, employees do not 
consider the wage to be the only reward, but 
value also other, iii) “psychological” rewards of 
employment: intrinsic motivation – which can in 
some situations be even more powerful. Indeed, 
monetary rewards can go as far as to crowd out 
this intrinsic motivation. Eventually we’ll also 
consider here the observation that in case of 
yardstick competition, i.e. rewards being based 
on measuring worker’s output relative to other 
workers’ output, one needs to consider also iv) 
social preferences, i.e. cooperative, reciprocal 
or indeed subversive motives for relationships 
among employees.
1.1 Reference-Dependence 
Decision-Making
An important contribution of the Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are reference-
dependence models which emphasise that 
economic agents use narrow bracketing and 
changes against reference points (Köszegi 
& Rabin, 2006) rather than fi nal and absolute 
wealth levels and their marginal changes.
In their seminal paper, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979, p. 273) illustrate reference-
dependent decision making in problems 11 
and 12. Consider fi rst the choice: 1,000 has 
just been given to you and added to whatever 
you already own. Choose between alternatives 
A: 50% chance of getting another 1,000, or B: 
100% chance of getting 500.
Now consider an alternative choice: 2,000 
has just been given to you and added to 
whatever you already own. Choose between the 
alternative C: 50% chance of losing 1,000, or D: 
100% chance of losing 500. Most participants 
in the experiment chose B in the fi rst case and 
C in the second (84% and 69%, respectively). 
Subjects displayed risk aversion on bets with 
positive payoffs, but exhibited risk-seeking over 
bets with negative payoffs. Seen from the point 
of view of the fi nal and total state, however, 
both sets of bets are identical, A = (2000, 0.5; 
1000, 0.5) = C  and B = (1500) = D.
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Preference reversal is a consequence of 
considering the bet alone without any regard to 
its impact on possible income, with subsequent 
revelation of risk aversion. As Kahneman 
and Tversky put it, “A salient characteristic of 
attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses 
loom larger than gains. The aggravation that 
one experiences in losing a sum of money 
appears to be greater than the pleasure 
associated with gaining the same amount,” 
(1979, p. 279). The act of overemphasising 
losses against equivalent gains is also used 
to explain the status quo bias (unwillingness 
to change the current state of things since any 
change would imply a loss of the current state), 
or to account for riskier behaviour as long as 
the decision maker fears a loss vis-a-vis his 
reference point (Imas, 2016).
When deciding about alternatives, therefore, 
people discount the level of income (a fi nal 
state) which already became a part of their 
expected wealth and does not, according to 
Prospect Theory, infl uence their decision in 
any signifi cant way anymore. Agents evaluate 
possible alternatives according to how they 
can move agents’ expected wealth away from 
a reference state. In case of workers’ decisions, 
agents will care not only about wage, but they 
will also get utility from the difference between 
current and expected reference wage wr:
U(ei,w,w 
r) = u(w(ei )) – c(ei )+ ϑR(w,w r), (3)
where 
R(w,w r) = { r(w – w r), for w ≥ w r
                    s(w – w 
r), for w < w r)
where r is increasing and concave, s is 
increasing and convex, whereby loss aversion 
implies that –s(–xi ) / r(xi ) ≈ 2; and ϑ > 0; is 
a weight showing how much more intensively 
the agent considers the distance from reference 
wage compared to the standard utility from 
ordinary wage level.
There is no single unique way of determining 
agent’s reference wage. Usually it is set at 
the level of past nominal wage wr = wt–1. Loss
aversion can then explain workers’ unwillingness 
to accept nominal wage reduction and a relatively 
stronger willingness to accept hidden reduction 
of the real wage (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1986). Employers anticipate this and instead of 
reducing wages they tend to reduce the number 
of employees (Bewley, 2007). Nevertheless, 
the idea of a reference wage as well as the 
whole concept of a reference point suffer from 
signifi cant problems associated with trying to 
ascertain how they are actually determined 
by economic agents. Worker can arbitrarily 
consider almost anything to be the reference 
wage: her reservation wage, average or 
median wage in the profession or in some fi eld, 
all can be infl uenced also by any anticipated 
(desired) changes. Any applied study must 
therefore always include a conceptualisation, 
a model of agents’ interpretation of gains 
and losses in different contexts. The most 
widely used approach is to use the concept 
of expectations, meaning that people observe 
(derived) consumption levels and then consider 
the difference between expected and actual 
consumption (Bewley, 2007).
Linda Babcock and George Lowenstein 
(1997) showed, for example, that when 
negotiating over wages, teachers’ unions were 
using comparisons to nearby school districts 
with higher wages, while school councils (their 
opponents) were making references to nearby 
schools with lower wages. The difference 
between these references then correlated with 
strike intensity (8% of disputes came to a strike, 
on average, lasting over 2 weeks). And yet 
these strategies were probably not intentionally 
and strategically engineered for the negotiation 
– for neither party was the difference between 
the reference groups correlated with the 
number of previous negotiations and therefore 
with experience. Both sides simply attributed 
different importance to different aspects 
of reality, thus producing a difference in 
expectations about their “correct” reference 
wage.
The effect of reference wage can be most 
easily identifi ed on short-term labour supply. 
New York City cab drivers have to decide every 
day for how long they are going to offer their 
services, given the day-to-day variability of 
demand they face (peaking during bad weather 
and/or when big conferences and public events 
are taking place in the city). In the standard 
model, hours worked should grow in line with 
any growth in demand for their services (one 
day’s earnings will have only a negligible 
income effect in the longer run). And yet actual 
cabbies work less on a demand-heavy day. 
One of possible explanations suggests that 
drivers expect a certain income – they have 
set themselves a specifi c target (reference) 
income they want to achieve every day. During 
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low demand for their services, then, they 
work longer hours to reach the target, while 
during peak demand their referential income 
is achieved quickly and they only work short 
hours. Elasticity of hours worked with respect to 
their earnings is therefore negative (Camerer, 
Babcock, Loewenstein, & Thaler, 1997). 
However, their income can be infl uenced also by 
other factors, and the data are also consistent 
with possible shifts on the labour supply side: 
the nature of work can worsen during the 
more intensive days and c(ei ) may grow; see 
for example (Farber, 2015; Stafford, 2015) for 
a cautionary note on the generalization of these 
target earning fi ndings. 
Such diffi culties in identifying causality are 
fortunately absent from a fi eld experiment, 
which rewarded one group of messengers 
with an expected wage rise of 25% and their 
productivity was compared with a similar group 
whose members did not enjoy a raise. The 
next month the roles reversed and it was (only) 
the second group who was given a higher 
wage. This design allows for measuring the 
supply side reaction (number of shifts worked 
and deliveries delivered) to an exogenous 
increase in the wage rate (Fehr & Götte, 2007). 
Messengers did work more shifts (usually 
lasting 5 hours) in the higher paying month, 
but they worked less intensively: the average 
number of delivered packages was lower. This 
fi nding is also more consistent with the theory 
of referential income. Workers are motivated 
by the higher wage to go to work more often, 
but achieving their reference income faster 
they can then reduce their work effort. Another 
explanation could also be tiredness after an 
intensive shift, but messengers were also lab-
tested for loss aversion by means of a lottery; 
messengers who refused a lottery offering 
50-50 odds of winning 8 CHF or losing 5 CHF 
were exactly those who exhibited a reduction 
of deliveries after wage increase. This again 
is suggestive of the existence of reference 
dependent preferences.
Applying equation (3) at a company level 
implies that even when the fi nal state of the 
worker’s reward is the same, her efforts can 
differ, depending on whether the reward is 
offered as an improvement or deterioration 
relative to a reference point. The infl uence of 
framing on productivity was tested in a real 
fi eld experiment in a Chinese electronics 
factory Wanlida Group Company (Hossain & 
List, 2012). When employees got a provisional 
bonus before the start of the workweek but were 
warned that they would lose it on payday unless 
they achieve the productivity norm, they worked 
more productively than employees of a control 
group who were merely given the standard 
promise to receive a bonus upon achieving the 
norm. The effect was relatively small, however; 
productivity grew by 1%. Interestingly, the 
effect of framing as a loss was stronger when 
whole teams were rewarded this way – social 
pressure came to bear on the less productive 
tea members. Long-term productivity gains 
were achieved through bonuses paid by both 
methods (ex post and ex ante) compared to 
workers receiving no bonuses at all.
Even though the framing of “reward as 
loss avoidance” was more effective and 
led to productivity gains, in some situations 
workers can interpret the mechanism as a sign 
of distrust. This brings up a more complex 
methodological problem: as a researcher one 
could be trying to model specifi c situations as 
part of one and the same scheme – even though 
the actual decision-making agents can interpret 
it differently. The incongruence between the 
actual decision-making mechanism by actual 
people and the researcher’s structural model 
that describes it then leads to un-predictive 
models (Hudík, 2012; Rusinova & Houdek, 
2013). In spite of all this, there may be yet 
another factor acting more strongly than loss 
aversion: reciprocity (as demonstrated e.g. in 
Christ, Sedatole and Towry, (2012)).
1.2 Reciprocity, Employment as a Gift 
Exchange
Compared to simple piece-rate remuneration, 
which clearly states (and enforces) both the 
product and the reward, actual work contracts 
are usually highly incomplete since they 
cannot capture the whole complexity of the job 
description expected from the worker. There are 
vague specifi cations of outcomes, outcomes 
are either impossible or costly to fully verify 
and therefore a fi xed wage w(xi) = wi is often 
specifi ed. All these things, however, enable the 
worker to shirk, or at least greatly vary her work 
effort. And on real workplaces shirking is not 
actually monitored all that much. Akerlof (1982) 
famously argued that employment contracts 
should be seen as “exchanges of gifts”. The 
employer gifts the employees a higher-than-
reservation wage and (some) employees in 
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return gift to the employer a higher effort than 
the minimum observable requirement.
Under reciprocity, equation (3) applies with 
the specifi cation that the reference point is 
higher than the required reservation wage, i.e. 
c (ei | g) < 0 since on the one hand the gift g 
reduces the disutility of work effort, and on the 
other hand utility is obtained from the reciprocal 
behaviour towards the employer. Therefore, 
equation (2) can be reformulated as
U(ei ,w) = u(w(ei )) – c(ei (g)),
given the expected ėt (g) < 0. 
(4)
First fi eld experiments to test this theory 
were undertaken by List and Gneezy (2006). 
In one of them day labourers were hired and 
offered a wage of 12 USD per hour to catalogue 
books in the library for six hours. First group 
of such workers really got this reward upon 
completing the work. The second group, 
however, was told before the beginning of 
their work that there is suddenly more money 
available for wages and that they would receive 
20 USD per hour. Productivity of both groups 
was then analysed. The group getting paid 
more than originally promised did indeed work 
much more intensively, to start with. However, 
over time the effect of the promise evaporated 
and after the third hour of work their productivity 
was indistinguishable from workers in the fi rst 
group. Other studies also imply that in general 
it is ineffective to pay gifts in the form of higher 
wages: the initial early boost to production 
eventually expires and does not cover the extra 
wage costs as productivity falls quickly over 
time (Fehr et al., 2009). Most of these studies, 
however, are testing only one-off temp jobs, 
which do not allow for building up reputation, 
a form of fi rm-specifi c social capital.
A similar experiment with cataloguing books 
was also undertaken in Germany, except this time 
it studied negative reciprocity (Kube, Maréchal, 
& Puppe, 2013). A job adverts again promised 
that workers will get “most probably” 15 EUR. As 
workers turned up, they were divided into three 
groups. One was given what was promised, the 
second one was told it would only get 10 EUR 
and the third group started working under the 
impression that they would get 20 EUR. Nobody 
from the less receiving group actually left; 
however, their productivity was consistently 20% 
below that of the normally-paid workers. Unlike 
quantity, the quality of their work was unaffected: 
workers merely reduced their effort instead of 
outright sabotaging the output. By contrast, 
the group, which was being paid more than 
promised was more productive by about 5%, but 
this was not signifi cant. Physical limits of output 
were controlled for throughout. Members of the 
last group were paid piece rate w(xi ) = wk  + βwi  
at 0.4 EUR per book. This group consistently 
achieved 25% higher productivity.
These results indicate that workers interpret 
the decision about the wage level as a social 
interaction, they surmise how justly or unjustly 
they are being treated by the employers and they 
react to it reciprocally. Positive reciprocity cools 
off over time, infl uence of negative reciprocity 
persists. Therefore, negative reciprocity is yet 
another factor explaining the downward rigidity 
of wages observed in the real world: companies 
rightly fear revenge activity from workers.
In a follow-up study (Kube, Marechal, & 
Puppe, 2012), the original authors adjusted the 
experimental design in order to test whether 
workers would be motivated more if they get 
7 euros’ worth in the form of a physical gift 
or as a higher monetary reward (compared 
to the benchmark treatment). Productivity 
was consistently higher in the monetary-gift-
rewarded group (the sense of fulfi lling one’s 
duty may therefore be stronger in Germans than 
in Americans), but the effect was insignifi cant. 
However, the physical gift of a thermal cup worth 
7 EUR elicited a permanent increase (by 30%) 
in productivity compared those who were gifted 
7 EUR in cash. Physical gift apparently implies 
good intentions of the employer and therefore 
a greater increase of commitment than through 
mere cash. These results indicate that results 
differ both across countries and across the form 
of an otherwise equally valued gift.
Evidence from real world labour relations is 
diffi cult to get since workers are understandably 
motivated to hide their true work effort, if they’re 
shirking. Labour market data also do not 
suggest that positive reciprocity is a strong 
factor determining labour supply – estimates 
of elasticity of output with respect to wage 
changes range from mere 0.07 to 0.38 (Kube 
et al., 2012). Even more problematic is trying to 
derive causality from these estimates: workers 
may be less productive as a result of reciprocal 
behaviour following a reduction in wages, 
or they may no longer feel any bond with the 
company and are looking for a new job which 
lowers their work discipline, etc.
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There are only a handful of real world 
studies testing similar behaviour rigorously. 
Management of one American Bridgestone/
Firestone tires factory wanted to lengthen the 
shifts from 8 to 12 hours in July 1994 and to lower 
the wages of new workers. Employees went 
on strike, which lasted with some adjustments 
for 2 years; but they partly continued working 
in the factory – the production was highly 
dependent on human labour and workers could 
therefore vent their frustration on the product. 
Data on car accidents then revealed that tyres 
produced in that factory over that time period 
were faultier and contributed to many deadly 
accidents (271 dead and 800 injured; and one 
of every 400 tires produced in the factory was 
returned under warranty). The frustration felt by 
employees was refl ected in the lower quality of 
work (Krueger & Mas, 2004).
Similar reaction was identifi ed among 
New Jersey policemen between 1978 and 
1996. After wage negotiations, which did not 
meet policemen’s demands, the rate of crime 
detection dropped by 12% compared to periods 
where their demands were met. There was 
even a drop in the average number of years of 
prison time the convicted criminals were getting 
at trial (suggesting that the policemen had not 
done their work thoroughly). Additionally, crime 
rate went up by 6% after policemen lost their 
negotiation (Mas, 2006).
1.3 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation, 
Crowding Out
It should by now be obvious that the standard 
worker’s expected utility model is incomplete. 
As we will show in this section, work effort can 
even bring positive utility of fulfi lling intrinsic 
motivation, m, to some workers (or under some 
circumstances). If we have i = {g} just like 
in the gift exchange case, we get c(ei |i) < 0 
(Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Kamenica, 
2012). In this framework the workers’ effort is 
not so much infl uenced by extrinsic motivation 
such as money or extensive oversight by the 
employers, it can even be destroyed by them.
Worker’s productivity is a function of 
various aspects of the employer’s behaviour, 
his trustworthiness, his attention to the worker’s 
individuality, his use of symbolic bonuses, 
intensity of supervision, and so on. Ellingsen 
and Johannesson (2007) illustrate these points 
with a case (David Packard’s memory of his 
General Electric’s experiences) when excessive 
control of issued material and tools in a General 
Electric factory did not lead to a reduction of 
thefts. On the contrary, theft became chronic 
since workers interpreted the measure as 
a sign of distrust and took up stealing from 
the company as a sport. Still, in general better 
supervision usually does increase productivity 
and reduce cheating (Pascual-Ezama, Prelec, 
& Dunfi eld, 2013). It is a regularity, which is 
likely to be culturally more universal.
Another study made important strides 
towards our understanding how meaningful 
workers consider their job to be. An experiment 
(Ariely, Kamenica, & Prelec, 2008) divided 
subjects into three groups which were tasked 
with simple mechanical job – in random 
sequences of letters printed on sheets of paper 
to mark chosen letters (there was a reward of 
$0.55 for fi nding 10 instances of two consecutive 
letters ‘s’). All workers were rewarded through 
piece rate, with every successive sheet of paper 
offering a linearly lowered wage. They were free 
to stop working at any point. For the fi rst group, 
the experimenter/supervisor always accepted 
their marked sheet without even checking it for 
mistakes. The second group was asked merely 
to place their marked papers on a growing 
pile (the experimenter/supervisor ignoring 
their work). The third group’s output was both 
ignored and destroyed, the experimenter/
supervisor immediately feeding their submitted 
sheets into a shredder. Although subjects could 
cheat in their work in all three groups (whereby 
the risk of discovery was the lowest in the 
third group), the gross output should not be 
very different across the groups. In reality the 
respective average outputs were 9, 6.8 and 6 
sheets of paper. In spite of obvious monetary 
rewards, workers were not ready to participate 
in meaningless work. We can fi nd an effect 
similar to “meaningfulness” also in the degree 
to which a worker identifi es with the company 
and its goals (as demonstrated by “economics 
of identity” (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005)).
It seems that monetary reward cannot 
fully compensate for an intrinsic drive to have 
a meaningful and fulfi lling job. At the same time, 
as just described, the relationship between the 
employer and the employee can be founded on 
trust and reciprocity; any monetary reward or 
supervision by the employer can weaken these 
motivations or even crowd them out completely. 
Productivity can suffer as a result (Gneezy 
et al., 2011). However, mutual infl uence of 
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individual motivations is not fully predictable 
and depends on specifi c context (Vranka & 
Houdek, 2015). Even in non-profi t organisations 
operating mostly on the basis of trust and 
intrinsic fulfi lment there are marked increases in 
effi ciency once stringent supervision of activity 
is introduced (Bengtsson & Engström, 2013).
1.4 Relative Remuneration
Things get more complicated when work effort 
is infl uenced by worker’s relationships to other 
co-workers. We shall concentrate here on 
the effect of remuneration. For effects on fi rm 
culture, peer pressure and others, see e.g. 
(Camerer & Malmendier, 2007, ch. 7.3).
Data of one British fruit company were 
used to test several remuneration mechanisms 
(Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2005). The fi rst 
one, “yardstick competition”, set a decreasing 
piece-rate dependent on the average 
productivity of all workers (workers’ pay depends 
on the ratio of his/her productivity to average 
productivity among all co-workers). Under these 
conditions, workers who consider the well-being 
of others have an incentive to exert low level 
of work effort. The second one was a simple 
piece-rate. Even though the implicit wage 
was lower, productivity in this group was 50% 
higher. It is impossible to distinguish from these 
results whether workers were being altruistic 
towards each other or whether they created 
a cartel against the employer, assuming they 
could check each other’s effort levels. The latter 
option seems more likely, since for those fruit 
pickers who could not see each other working 
there were no differences in productivity under 
different remuneration mechanisms (moreover 
Bandiera et al.’s fi ndings thus casts doubt on 
the income targeting hypothesis).
Other studies on relative remuneration 
do not yield such clear-cut results. Introduction 
of relative evaluations, whether in the form 
of bonuses or sanctions (Kuběna, Houdek, 
Lindová, Příplatová, & Flegr, 2014), or the 
probability of promotion, will make a sabotage 
of co-workers‘ labour more attractive (Harbring, 
Irlenbusch, Kräkel, & Selten, 2007). Those 
co-workers in turn, realising the risk of 
being harmed, may themselves reduce their 
productivity (Chen, 2003).
On the other hand, workers may be subject 
to positive social pressure and associated 
increased productivity. A study of productivity 
of cashiers in one large American supermarket 
revealed that augmenting a group of cashiers 
with one highly productive cashier (who is 
able to see other cashiers) will increase their 
productivity. This effect is relatively high; a 1% 
more productive observing-cashier will result 
in a 0.23% increased productivity of observed-
cashier. This fi nding is true even after controlling 
for possible cooperation between the more 
and less productive cashiers (such as helping 
each other out with manually entered codes of 
unmarked and with un-scannable items) (Mas & 
Moretti, 2009; Herbst & Mas, 2015).
2. Decision-Making by Managers
If we said that it is diffi cult to monitor (or 
motivate) individual work effort in workers, in 
managers it is doubly diffi cult. They may appear 
to be subject to transparent evaluation criteria 
in terms of the company’s fi nancial health 
(or share price), but attaching their specifi c 
contribution to these aggregates co-infl uenced 
by plethora of other factors is very hard indeed.
Equation (2) abstracted from effects of 
chance or an external shock θi on worker’s 
remuneration, w(f(ei , si) + θi), though in reality 
exogenous shocks do indeed affect the output 
especially of top managers. Not even owners 
can often identify such infl uences and set 
wCEO (f(θi )). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
showed that CEO’s reward is also a function 
of chance or “luck”, not just of their own effort: 
CEOs receive substantial bonuses even in 
situations when profi ts come through a positive 
movement of the exchange rate or through an 
increase in the world price (e.g. of oil in case 
of oil company CEOs) – events which they 
had no way of achieving directly. It has also 
been shown that CEOs lower their productivity 
after receiving a prestigious prize for their 
management skills, and yet continue to be paid 
even better than before (Malmendier & Tate, 
2009).
Managers often do not admit to (or are 
unaware of) their own mistakes (Houdek & 
Koblovský, 2016; Houdek, 2016) and hold 
on to unproductive investments or company 
workfl ows. This can be explained by the 
principal-agent problem (the manager-agent 
has a reputational incentive not to publicise his 
mistakes since the owner-principal is unlikely to 
uncover them). But sticking to status quo can 
also imply avoidance of (psychological) loss that 
would obtain from admitting a mistake. Pedace 
and Kiholm Smith (2013) studied managing 
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coaches of baseball teams and showed that 
loss aversion plays a substantial role in their 
decision-making. When a player of the managed 
team suffers from low game productivity, he 
stands a lower risk of being replaced if it was the 
current coach who originally hired him. Should 
the coach change, however, the probability of 
letting go of an unproductive player increases. 
This can also hardly be attributed to the coach’s 
reputational vested interest since the effect 
is the same independent of the length of his 
career and therefore also of his future career 
prospects. This study therefore nicely highlights 
the importance of replacing top managers 
frequently enough to open up the possibility of 
re-evaluating set procedures and the ability to 
terminate ineffective ones – now that they are 
no longer tied with former decisions of current 
managers.
When supervision by owners-principals is 
weak, psychological tendencies of managers-
agents can be even stronger than those of 
employees. To illustrate the point – even events 
like the birth of their child infl uence CEOs’ 
decision-making (Dahl, Dezső, & Ross, 2012). 
Danish CEOs increase their own remuneration 
following the birth of their child (especially if 
it is a son). Perhaps that is a rational move 
trying to provide better for the family. But 
there are signs that they also lower wages to 
employees, but less severely to women. That 
may imply increased empathy towards them 
after their own close encounter with childbirth – 
a psychological motive.
Camerer and Malmendier (2007) summarise 
other heuristics of managerial behaviour – 
biases in attaching responsibility, in directing 
effort, etc. Here we shall limit ourselves only to 
excessive optimism and overconfi dence. Two 
papers (Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 2008) show 
that managers overestimate their ability to select 
successful projects, resulting in investment into 
excessive variance of different projects as well 
as in overpriced takeover bids and mergers. 
Excessive self-confi dence was measured by 
the degree to which CEOs held onto their share 
options until expiry, in spite of most of them 
having very under-diversifi ed portfolio (such 
behaviour would make sense only of a CEO 
overestimates his ability to “create” high future 
profi tability of the company, assuming away any 
fraudulent insider-information trading).
Overconfi dence and excessive optimism 
also explains the dependence of company’s 
investment on its available liquidity (and not 
on availability of credit or on entrepreneurial 
opportunities, for example). CEOs prefer 
internal, mentally “cheaper” fi nancing. It is, 
however, important to interpret these results 
in the right context, since risk aversion will 
tend to be lower with CEOs or businesspeople 
in general, compared with the rest of the 
population. Equally, self-confi dence or optimism 
will tend to be necessarily higher (Ben-David, 
Graham, & Harvey, 2013; Graham, Harvey, & 
Puri, 2013).
Conclusions
Behavioural industrial organisation is a new 
fi eld and many results of its empirical studies 
are unique and/or based on specifi c sectors 
and contexts. There is no doubt that the low 
geographic, cultural and legal diversity of 
sources is a shortcoming of our current state 
of knowledge. The vast majority of studies use 
data from Anglo-Saxon (USA, UK) or German-
speaking (Switzerland, Germany) economies. 
The intensity of reciprocity of workers still 
differs greatly even among these developed 
economies, as we have shown in section 
1.2. It remains an open question to what 
extent one can reproduce the aforementioned 
results in post-communist, Latin American or 
Asian countries with different values and legal 
traditions on the labour market.
It is reasonable to expect that idiosyncrasies 
of workplace culture, be they sectoral or national, 
will continue to play an important role. For 
instance, industrial organisation is infl uenced 
also by national levels of interpersonal trust: 
in countries where people trust each other 
more, companies have a greater tendency to 
decentralise decision-making about hiring, 
production or sales, which leads to a general 
increase in productivity (Bloom, Sadun, & 
Van Reenen, 2012). One culture tolerates 
not turning up to work for personal reasons, 
another culture frowns upon it (Parboteeah, 
Addae, & Cullen, 2005), and so on. Future 
empirical work will therefore have to pay an 
increasing attention to accounting for agents’ 
heterogeneity in preferences, values and ways 
of decision-making since they all infl uence 
subsequent dynamics of companies. See for 
example the effect of gender composition of 
teams on their productivity (Hoogendoorn, 
Oosterbeek, & Van Praag, 2013), or explaining 
wage differentials between men and women 
EM_1_2017.indd   11 13.3.2017   16:58:33
12 2017, XX, 1
Ekonomie
not only with traditional variables but also with 
preferences for competitiveness, bearing of risk 
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009) etc.
Identifi cation of (psychological) regularities 
in decision-making (including possible errors 
and biases) of workers and managers will 
be necessarily followed by an adjustment in 
behaviour of the very companies and owners. 
That will make the resulting behavioural 
dynamic more diffi cult to predict. Yet one 
should not expect that behavioural tendencies 
will be completely ironed out. One reason is 
that many of these tendencies take the form 
of pure economic preference and there is no 
reason why they should disappear: workers will 
not stop caring about the way they are treated 
by their employers. Another one is that some 
decisions on the labour market are only taken 
rarely, and therefore do not enjoy the luxury 
of a direct feedback. Optimal learning might 
then fail to take place. Behavioural correction 
or learning itself can be heuristic and result in 
an error intensifi cation rather than correction. 
It also seems to be the case that learned 
behaviour or abilities might not necessarily be 
transferable between different contexts of one’s 
decision (Loewenstein, 1999).
Further development of the fi eld will be 
replete with new and detailed data about 
economic agents’ behaviour within fi rms 
and outside. The growing popularity of 
fi eld experiments or randomised controlled 
trials within economics and the associated 
further growth in available data will enable 
a construction of more precise and robust 
theories of behaviour of workers and managers.
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Abstract
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATION: EMPLOYEES 
AND MANAGERS
Petr Houdek, Petr Koblovský
This short perspective article presents an overview of empirical evidence on the behavioural 
organizational economics on the basis of the extended standard model of worker’s behaviour. The 
advancements of behavioural economics theories, new detailed and structured data on actions of 
economic actors, and increasingly used fi elds experiments provide a strong basis for the creation 
of more precise and more robust models of the behaviour of employers and employees. In this 
article we analyse 4 stylized extensions of standard model of worker’s behaviour. Firstly, we give 
several examples of worker’s reference dependent decision-making. Secondly, we utilize Akerlof’s 
hypothesis on the relationship between an employer and an employee which is as predicted very 
reciprocal, similarly to the gifts exchange paradigm. We show that the more the employee thinks 
s/he is trusted by the employer, the harder and more effi ciently s/he works. Thirdly, we show several 
instances of the importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in employees and how those two 
motivations interfere with each other and crowd each other out in some situations. The research 
shows that meaningfulness of the work can be a signifi cant driver of the employees’ effi ciency 
as well. In the last section devoted to employees we provide evidence on the impacts of relative 
performance compensation on cooperation, reciprocity, and sabotage in fi rms. The last part is 
devoted to analysing behavioural regularities of managers in their day-to-day decision-making. 
The overview briefl y expands particularly on their over-optimism and on their possibly undeserved 
remuneration resulting from random events and market changes rather than from the managerial 
skills. The article concludes by proposing possible directions for further fi eld research.
Key Words: Behavioural economics, fi rm culture, fi eld experiments, gift exchange, hubris, 
CEO, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, loss aversion, reference-dependence model, reciprocity, 
social preferences, wage, labour.
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